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Are Acquiring-Firm Shareholders Better Off after 
an Acquisition?
ELLEN B. MAGENHEIM 
DENNIS C. MUELLER
Out of the massive amount of research on 
acquisitions that has been conducted over 
the past 20 years, some consensus on 
major issues has emerged. But perhaps sur­
prisingly, several key issues remain in dis­
pute. On the positive side, early theoretical 
contributions showed that diversification 
through mergers was an inefficient method 
for spreading risks (Levy and Sarnat, 1970; 
Smith, 1970; Azzi, 1978), and empirical 
findings have corroborated this result 
(Smith and Schreiner, 1969; Mason and 
Goudzwaard, 1976). All observers have 
found that shareholders of acquired com­
panies enjoy substantial immediate gains 
from the acquisitions, and no disagree­
ment exists on this point. But the pattern 
of results with respect to the returns to ac- . 
quiring-firm shareholders has been varied. 
One study claims to find positive gains; an­
other records negative returns. Nor do 
reviewers of this literature reach a consen­
sus (e.g., compare Mueller, 1977, 1980; 
Scherer, 1980, pp. 138-141; Halpern, 1983; 
Jensen and Ruback, 1983).
This lack of consensus carries over into 
the explanations for why acquisitions 
occur. One group of observers sees acqui­
sitions as a means for improving the allo­
cation of assets by transferring assets to ^ 
more capable management or achieving 
other synergistic gains from the transfer of 
control (Manne, 1965; Mandelker, 1974; 
Dodd and Ruback, 1977). Adherents to 
this view claim that the existing evidence 
indicates that acquiring-firm shareholders
are slightly better off or, at minimum, no 
worse off as a result of acquisitions (Hal­
pern, 1983; Jensen and Ruback, 1983).
Although this interpretation of the evi­
dence, if valid, would appear to vindicate 
a liberal antimerger policy (acquired-firm 
shareholders are better off; acquiring-firm 
shareholders are not worse off), it still 
raises fundamental questions about the 
theory of the firm and the market for cor­
porate control, which feed back onto the 
broader policy issues. Acquired-firm man­
agers may sometimes be unwilling partners 
to an acquisition, as in a hostile takeover, 
but acquiring-firm managers need never 
be. Why do the latter enter so readily into 
the market for corporate control, given its , 
well-known large risks and apparently 
modest returns?
Several observers have answered this 
question by hypothesizing that managers 
undertake acquisitions which increase 
their utility but do not necessarily increase 
shareholder wealth (Mueller, 1969; Firth, 
1980; Amihud and Lev, 1981; Greer,
1984). To the extent that these hypotheses 
are valid, the possibility must be enter­
tained that acquisitions neither enhance 
acquiring-firm shareholder wealth nor con­
fer broader social benefits. Thus, the issue 
of what the gains to acquiring-firm share­
holders are is central to both the theory of 
the firm and public policy regarding 
acquisitions.
For this reason, the seemingly contradic­
tory results regarding the effects of acqui-
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sitions on acquiring-firm shareholders and 
the lack of consensus among observers of 
what the results signify are disconcerting. 
It is the thesis of this paper that disagree­
ment regarding the impact of acquisitions 
'^on acquiring-firm shareholders stems in 
part from the different methodologies in­
dividual studies have used. Measures of 
the impact of an acquisition on acquiring- 
firm shareholders are quite sensitive to the 
choice of methodology. In effect, authors 
have been asking different questions about 
the performance of acquiring-firm shares 
and, not surprisingly, have come up with 
different answers. We shall show that when 
one attempts to ask the same question in 
V each study, the results turn out to be far 
more consistent than was heretofore 
apparent.
To do so, we reexamine the basic meth­
odology used to measure the effects of ac­
quisitions, placing particular emphasis on 
the pattern of returns to acquiring-firm 
shareholders before and after the acquisi­
tion (the first section). In the second sec­
tion, we demonstrate the sensitivity of the 
results to the choice of methodology, i.e., 
to the particular question asked, using data 
for 78 mergers and takeovers in the years 
1976 to 1981. In the light of the method­
ological issues raised in the first two sec­
tions, we reexamine the results of several 
published studies in the third section. Con­
clusions follow.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN 
MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF 
ACQUISITIONS
The basic assumption underlying the use 
of stock market data to estimate the effects 
of acquisitions is, of course, that share 
prices reflect future profit and dividend 
streams, and that any changes in future 
profit and dividend streams an acquisition 
is expected to bring about are reflected in 
" changes in the prices and returns of the 
company’s shares. Granting this assump­
tion, one can test for the expected effect of 
an acquistion on future profit and divi­
dend streams by measuring the change in 
returns to acquiring-company shareholders
accompanying an acquisition. To measure 
such a change, two questions must be an­
swered: When is the effect of the acquisi­
tion on stockholder returns to be mea­
sured? How is the effect of the acquisition 
separated from other coterminous events 
that affect stockholder returns?
The first question could be easily re­
solved if all of the relevant information re­
garding an acquisition were to become 
public on the day the acquisition is an­
nounced and the market could be assumed 
to adjust fully in that day to the new infor­
mation. But news of an acquisition is 
known to leak into the market prior to the 
first public announcement, and it is un­
realistic to assume that the market is ca­
pable of predicting the full future conse­
quences of an acquisition immediately 
upon learning of it. The latter point is a key 
part of our critique of the existing litera­
ture and requires some elaboration.
Robert Shiller (1981) has shown that 
swings in stock market prices exceed by 
factors of five and more those which 
should have occurred given the actual 
movements in dividend streams that 
occur. In a bull market, prices rise by far 
more than subsequent increases in divi­
dends will warrant; in a bear market, they 
fall too far. The market has historically 
continually shifted from being too optimis­
tic in bull markets to being too pessimistic 
in bear markets. Shiller (1984, 1986) hy­
pothesizes that the behavior of individuals 
in the stock market is best explained 
' through the psychology of fads and band­
wagon movements.
Shiller’s findings and his explanation of 
them are particularly relevant to the liter­
ature on mergers and takeovers, since it is 
well known that acquisition activity has 
been highly correlated with stock market 
activity.* Mergers and takeovers have oc- 
cured most frequently at times when stock 
' market prices are rising and the market in 
general is known to be overly optimistic 
about the future performance of compa­
nies. Since acquisition and stock market 
activity seem to respond to the same un­
derlying economic environment and psy­
chological factors (Geroski, 1984), it is rea­
sonable to suppose, or at least prudent to
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allow for the possibility, that the stock 
market might be overly optimistic in its 
evaluation of acquisitions at the time they 
are first announced. Shiller’s results, com­
bined with the positive correlation of ac­
quisition and stock market activity, sug­
gest the importance of tracing the effects of 
an acquisition’s announcement on a 
stock’s price over a long enough period to 
ensure that any changes in stock prices are 
an unbiased reflection of the future effect 
of the acquisition on profits and dividends.
The second conceptual issue to be re­
solved is the separation of the effects of 
the acquisition from other coterminous 
events, i.e., the prediction of what the re­
turn on the firm’s shares would have been 
in the absence of the acquistion, over 
whatever period is chosen to record this 
event. The counterfactual can never, of 
course, be truly predicted. Three approxi­
mations have been employed in the litera­
ture: (1) to assume the firm’s returns post­
event would have been the same as its re­
turns preevent in the absence of the acqui­
sition, (2) to select a control group and as­
sume the firm’s returns postevent would 
have been the same as those of the control 
group firm(s), or (3) a combination of (1) 
and (2), i.e., to assume that the change in 
returns of the acquiring firm following the ^ 
acquisition’s announcement would have 
been the same as the change in returns for 
the control group firm(s) for the same time 
period. The difference between this pre­
dicted change and the change actually ob­
served is attributed to the acquisition. The 
third method is obviously the best. If one 
simply compares a firm’s postevent perfor­
mance to its preevent performance, one ig­
nores all of the other events that may be 
occurring coterminously with the acquisi­
tion and affecting its returns. But if one 
predicts a firm’s returns in the postevent 
period entirely from the control group 
(method 2) one ignores any systematic dif­
ference between the merging firm(s) and 
the control group that may exist. This lat­
ter point proves to be very important be­
cause, as we shall see, there are sizable dif­
ferences between the performance of 
acquiring firms and the usually employed 
control groups over the preevent period.
If all events other than the acquisition 
that affect a firm’s returns have the same 
effect on the firm’s control group, then one 
should be able to isolate the effect of an ac­
quisition by predicting the change in re­
turns for the acquiring firm from the ob­
served change in returns for the eontrol 
group firms, and calculating the difference 
between observed and predicted returns as 
the effect of the acquisition. The most fre­
quently employed control group in acqui­
sition-stockholder returns studies is the 
market portfolio, the returns on all securi­
ties each weighted by its aggregate market 
value.
More formally, the returns for a given 
firm i are predicted from the characteristic 
line
E (f?,) = -F 0, [E (/? J -Rf] (11.1)
where £'(jR,) and E{R„) are the expected re­
turns for firm i and the market portfolio, 
respectively, Rf is the return on a riskless 
(0 = d) asset, and /J, is the covariance of fs 
returns with the market portfolio divided 
by the variance of the market portfolio. 
Equation (11.1) is one of the eentral results 
of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). 
It states that the return on any firm i’s 
shares, Ri, varies directly with the return 
on the portfolio of all shares, and thus 
that changes in can be predicted from 
changes in R^ if /3, is unchanged.^ The d, 
term can be estimated from a time-series 
regression of /?„ on or, as is frequently 
done, from a regression of (i?„ — Rf) on 
{R„, — Rf). By Equation (11.1), the inter­
cept of this equation should equal zero. 
But if the intercept is not constrained to 
equal zero, regressions of the following sort 
typically yield nonzero estimates of a,:
(.R, - Rf)
= + 3/ {Rm, — Rf) + ^it (11-2)
Now a, is basically the average residual 
from the characteristic equation (11.1) for 
firm i implied by the CAPM. As such, it is 
a measure of the performance of the com­
pany over the sample period used to esti­
mate |3, (Jensen, 1969), and has been so 
used in some acquisition studies (e.g., Wes-
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ton, Smith, and Shrieves, 1972). A com­
pany with a, > 0 has on average earned 
higher returns than are predicted by the 
CAPM. If |8, were not affected by the ac­
quisition, one way to estimate the effects of 
the acquisition would be to estimate a, 
from data from before the acquisition and 
again from data following its announce­
ment. The change in a, between the two pe­
riods would then be an estimate of the ef­
fect of the acquisition on firm f’s returns 
assuming all other effects are captured 
through the movement of (i?„, — Rjj) over 
the two periods. Alternatively, one can es­
timate (11.2) by usiiig preevent data, and 
then use the a, and estimated from the 
preevent data to predict from the post­
event R„u and Rf,. The difference between 
the actual and predicted i?„ based on the 
preevent a, and d, is a second measure of 
the effect of the acquisition on shareholder 
returns.
Both a, and ;8, are likely to vary with the 
choice of time period used to estimate 
them. If this variation is random, mea­
sures of the effects of acquisitions are not 
biased by the choice of time period for es­
timating a, and although the power of 
the tests is weakened. But there is consid­
erable evidence, reviewed later, that ac­
quiring firms earn substantial, positive ab­
normal returns over a period running 
anywhere from 18 to 66 months prior to 
the acquisition announcements. Given this 
evidence, the estimates one obtains of the 
effects of acquisitions are sensitive to how 
the preevent data are treated when esti­
mating a, and . Studies differ widely as 
to how they treat the preevent period when 
estimating the a, and used in predicting 
postevent performance, and this difference 
will be shown to have a significant influ­
ence on one’s evaluation of the impact of 
the acquisition on stockholder returns.
Although substantial excess returns for 
acquiring firms have been estimated over 
prolonged preevent periods in several 
studies, little attention has been paid to 
these returns. Perhaps the neglect of the re­
turns to acquiring firms prior to acquisi­
tions can be explained by the prevailing 
view among many of those working in this 
area that it is deficiencies in the acquired
firm’s performance that precipitate acqui­
sitions. But if managers undertake acqui­
sitions which worsen the performance of 
their companies’ shares, it is logical to as­
sume that they would choose to announce 
J the acquisitions at times when the perfor­
mance of their shares is above average. 
Also, the above-normal return perfor­
mance of acquiring-firm shares prior to ac- 
: quisitions may signal above-normal profit 
flows which can be used to finance the ac­
quisitions. Thus, the above-normal perfor­
mance of acquiring firms’ shares over sus- 
. tained intervals prior to their making an 
acquisition may explain why these partic­
ular firms’ managements have chosen to 
make an acquisition at these particular 
points in time. Whether or not this conjec­
ture regarding casuality is correct, it seems 
obvious that one should take into account 
this preevent performance of the acquiring 
firms when measuring the change in per­
formance the acquisitions bring about.
We face now three conceptual problems: 
(1) How does one pinpoint the first arrival 
of information concerning the acquisition 
to the market? (2) Over what period should 
the preevent performance of the firm be 
measured to determine the change in per­
formance caused by the acquisition? (3) 
How long a period after this event should 
one allow to measure the full effect of the 
acquisition on the acquiring firm’s returns?
Somewhat surprisingly, the first ques­
tion is the easiest to answer. While acqui­
sition announcements do not seem to have 
had a large, systematic impact on acquir- 
ing-firm share prices, they have a predict­
able and large positive impact on acquired- 
firm share prices owing to the substantial 
premiums offered. An individual with 
nonpublic information of an acquisition 
will make a more certain and substantial 
gain by purchasing the shares of the to-be- 
acquired firm. Thus, the date of the first 
impact of the acquisition on firm share 
prices can be determined by examining the 
share price performance of the acquired 
firm. The month (day) in which its returns 
begin the sustained rise that culminates in 
the acquisition can be taken to be the point 
in time at which knowledge of the acqui­
sition reaches the market. Most studies
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seem to indicate that information of an ac­
quisition reaches the market in the month 
of the announcement or the month before. 
No study which we have seen presents ev­
idence suggesting that information of the 
acquisition reaches the market more than 
four months prior to its announcement. 
Thus, we should expect to see the effects of 
acquisitions on acquiring-firm share prices 
commencing over a short time interval 
prior to the announcement month.
The question of what preevent period 
should be used against which to measure 
postevent performance is obviously some­
what arbitrary. It seems to us more reason­
able to judge the effect of an acquisition 
'' against the period immediately preceding 
the market’s learning of the acquisition 
than against a period some distance re­
moved, since the acquiring firm’s perfor­
mance over the three preceding years is 
more relevant than over the interval four 
to six years before the acquisition, if one 
wishes to measure the change in perfor­
mance caused by the acquisition.
If Equation (11.2) estimated on preevent 
data is used to predict post-acquisition per­
formance, then an improvement in perfor­
mance upon the market’s obtaining infor­
mation of an acquisition should appear as 
an upward movement in the residuals one 
obtains when preevent estimates of a, and 
d, are used to predict postevent perfor­
mance. Should one observe a systematic 
rise (fall) in the cumulative residuals from 
(11.1) commencing around the time of the 
acquisition, one might reasonably attribute 
this movement to the acquisition. As long 
as the cumulative residuals continue the 
rise (fall), which commenced with the ac­
quisition, one can assume that the market 
is continuing to reevaluate the expected ef­
fects of the acquisition on the acquiring 
firm’s performance. When the rise (fall) 
stops, the adjustment process is complete.
On the other hand, the market may re­
evaluate a firm’s prospects as a conse­
quence of an acquisition at almost any 
point in time following its announcement 
at which new information is received (e.g., 
a manager leaves; a contract is lost). If all 
subsequent movements in share prices not 
caused by the acquisition are assumed to
be random, then a prudent strategy for en­
suring that all possible effects on share 
prices caused by the acquisition are cap­
tured is to measure the acquiring firm’s 
postevent performance over as long a pe­
riod as possible. Here again, as we shall 
show, one’s interpretation of the effects of 
an acquisition is in some cases sensitive to 
just how long an interval one allows the 
market to complete its evaluation after the 
acquisition.
ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF 
ACQUISITIONS ON THE PERFORMANCE 
OF A SAMPLE OF ACQUIRING FIRMS
In this section, we examine the implica­
tions of the methodological issues just dis­
cussed for a specific sample of acquiring 
firms. A description of the sample is pre­
sented, and the techniques for measuring 
returns are discussed. Particular emphasis 
is placed on the sensitivity of the conclu­
sions to the choice of a time period for 
measuring the market model, and the 
length of time over which postevent re­
turns are measured.
Description of the Sample
The sample of 78 acquiring firms is com­
posed of companies completing takeovers 
valued at $15 million or more. Of the 78 
acquiring firms, 51 entered into mergers 
and 26 into tender offers.^ All of the firms 
are listed on the New York or American 
Stock Exchanges. To ensure data availabil­
ity, only firms listed on Price-Dividend- 
Earnings (PDE) tapes are included. The 
sample period begins in 1976. To ensure 
three full years of postevent data, we spec­
ify 1981 as the end of the sample period. 
Announcement and completion dates and 
the mode of acquisition in each case were 
checked in the Wall Street Journal.
These acquisitions span a more recent 
time period than do samples previously 
analyzed. We describe here some charac­
teristics of this sample. The distribution of 
initial bid announcements is reported in 
Table 11.1. These bids were made within 
an active market for acquisitions.'* The
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Table 11.1 Distribution of Initial 
Announcement of Acquisition Bid by Year
Year Number of Acquisition Bids
1976 9
1977 9
1978 21
1979 18
1980 7
1981 14
level of acquisition activity intensified in 
the mid 1970s following a fairly placid pe­
riod; the end of the sample period coin­
cides with a leveling off in the number of 
transactions recorded (W. T. Grimm, 
1984). This wave of activity coincides with 
a periodically depressed stock market 
which makes it an anomaly among acqui­
sition waves.
On average, 16 weeks elapsed between 
the bid announcement and completion of 
'the transition; the median level is 13 
weeks. The length of the interval ranges 
from 1 week or less in three cases to more 
than 80 weeks in two cases. The average 
ratio of the preevent equity value of ac­
quiring to acquired firm is 3.77. The aver­
age percentage premium over stock value 
paid by sample firms is 81%, and the 
average value of the premium paid to ac­
quired-firm shareholders is $191.58 
million.
Methodology for Measuring Abnormal 
Returns
To measure the effect of acquisitions on 
stock price returns, we follow the Fama, 
Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) event study 
technique. This technique relies on the use 
of the market portfolio as a control group 
to capture the effect of marketwide fluctua­
tions in stock prices. Any remaining un­
explained abnormal performance can be 
attributed to the effect of a specific 
event—in this case, an acquisition bid 
announcement.
We estimated the following market 
model using ordinary least-squares 
regression.^
Rii = 01 i -I- fiiRm + (11-3)
where
Ri, = return on stock i at time t 
R„, = return on the market portfolio at 
time t
Ci, = homoscedastic, normally
distributed, serially uncorrelated, 
zero-mean-error term with 
variance a (4)
The coefficient on R„„ measures the 
sensitivity of the fth firm’s return to fluc­
tuations in the market index. The intercept 
measures the risk-free return plus the av­
erage abnormal performance of the firm 
over the sample period used to estimate 
(11.3). The error measures that part of 
Ri, which is due to neither movements in 
the return on the market portfolio nor to 
the firm’s average abnormal return.
Each R„ is calculated from monthly data 
taken from the PDE tapes, with stock 
prices adjusted for splits and dividends. 
The New York Stock Exchange equally 
weighted index is used as a proxy for the 
market portfolio. Monthly residuals for 
each firm / are calculated as e„ = — R,,.
From these monthly residuals for each 
firm, average abnormal returns are calcu­
lated for each time t:
where I is the total number of firms and t 
= 0 is the event date, i.e., the month of the 
initial announcement. This yields, for each 
time period, a measure of the average di­
vergence between actual and forecast re­
turns, adjusted for each firm’s normal level 
of performance and for marketwide fluc­
tuations. Cumulated average abnormal re­
turns are then calculated as
CAR,, = f^AR,
t = X
where x and y are the start and end dates 
of the cumulation period. To test the sta­
tistical significance of the average and cu­
mulative average abnormal returns, we
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construct a test statistic following the com­
monly used procedure (Linn and Mc­
Connell, 1983; Malatesta, 1983).
Results
In this section, the sensitivity of conclu­
sions regarding the effect of acquisitions on 
firm returns to the time period used to es­
timate the market model coefficients and 
the length of the postevent measurement 
period is shown. We first review what we 
define as our basic case; then we show how 
results change with the ehoice of different 
estimation periods. To understand these 
changes more fully, we examine how a, the 
measure of the firm’s abnormal perfor- 
mance over the estimation period, varies 
with the choice of time period.
To allow for information reaching the 
market prior to an acquisition’s announce- 
^ ment, all preevent periods are ended four 
months prior to the announcement month, 
an interval which seems prudent on the 
basis of existing studies (see the third sec­
tion). Consistent with previous research, 
we find significant positive gains being 
''earned in the two years preceding the 
event. During the period [—24, —4] ac­
quirers earn returns that are 18.4% in ex­
cess of the expected returns based on their 
performance over the [ — 60, —25] period 
(Table 11.2). These abnormal returns are 
significant at the .05 level. The pattern of 
returns for each firm was examined over 
this preevent period. Of the 78 firms, 71 
experienced a preevent upward trend in 
abnormal returns which, on average, began 
at i = —33. For the 48 merging firms, 
this upward trend began, on average, at 
t = —29; for 21 firms making tender offers 
the upward movement begins, on average, 
at t = —36.
The returns for the [ — 3, —1] period, 
measured by using coefficients estimated 
from [ — 60, —4], introduce a trend of neg­
ative but insignificant returns that contin­
ues for the two years following the event. 
In the third postevent year, however, sig­
nificant losses of —9% occur. A pattern 
emerges in which acquirers earn substan­
tial positive gains until shortly before the
Table 11.2 Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns: All Sample Firms
Forecast Period Estimation Period
[-60, -25] [-60, -4]
[-24, -4] .1839(3.4161f
[-3, -1] — -.0148(-.5683)
[0] • -- .0019(-.3386)
[1,6] — -.0336(-1.273)
[7, 12] — -.0121(-.6261)
[13, 24] — -.0096(-.3403)
[25, 36] — -.0883(-.2115)
[-3, 36] — -.1565(-1.2364)
®The numbers in parentheses are the test statistics which are 
distributed standard normal.
event, following which returns begin to 
drop.
Breaking the full sample down by type of 
transaction, we see similar patterns (Table 
11.3). Firms engaging in tender offers and 
mergers earn large positive gains prior to 
the event; the level ranges from 28% for the 
former group to 12.7% for the latter. 
Around the event month and over the next 
three years, a mixed pattern is observed. 
Bidders in tender offers experience a sharp 
drop in returns in the second year after the 
event, a sharp rise in the third year. In the 
third year, [24, 36], acquiring firms in 
mergers exhibit a significant decline in re­
turns. Despite these differences, we confine 
most of our attention to the combined 
sample of 78 acquisitions, since we do not 
have enough observations on tender offers 
to undertake a meaningful separate analy­
sis for this group. For both groups of ac­
quiring firms the pattern emerges that the 
preevent period is one of positive abnor­
mal performance; returns in the postevent 
period reflect a lower level of performance.
The high performance in the three years
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Table 11.3 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns by Mode of Acquisition
Estimation Period
[-60, -25] [-60, -4]
Forecast Period Mergers Tender Offers Mergers Tender Offers
[-24, -4] .1271(1.9472)“
.2804
(2.6400) — —
[-3, -1] -.0300 .0122(-.9918) (.3078)
[0] — —
-.0037
(-.6769)
.0138
(.4500)
[1.6] — —
-.0495
(-1.3182)
.0022
(-.1339)
[7, 12] — —
-.0252
(-.6257)
.0209
(.0968)
[13, 24] — —
.0281
(1.0110)
-.0908
(-1.0091)
[25, 36] — —
-.1971
(-3.709)
.1309
(1.7843)
[-3, 36] — —
-.2774
(-2.6039)
.0892
(.5633)
“The numbers in parentheses are the test statistics which are distributed standard normal.
prior to the event suggests that the treat­
ment of this period in estimation of the 
market model coefficients may signifi­
cantly affect the measurement of abnormal 
returns. Since the intercept measures firm 
performance over the estimation period, 
an intercept calculated from this period of 
above-normal performance is larger than if 
calculated from a lower-performance pe­
riod. With a higher benchmark the resid­
uals calculated relative to this “normal” 
performance level are lower.
Table 11.4 provides evidence of how the 
performance benchmark embodied in a, 
varies with differences in the estimation 
period. The first estimate of mean a is
Table 11.4 Average Intercepts by Estimation 
Period, All 78 Firms
Estimation Period Mean a
[-60, -25] .0091 .0150
[-60, -4] .0134 .0127
[-36, -4] .0181 .0189
[-3, 36] .0107 .0147
[4, 36] .0080 .0300
.0091, based on [—60, —25]. It is small re­
lative to the estimate of .0134 calculated 
from the period [—60, —4], reflecting the 
upward trend in returns that begins ap­
proximately three years prior to the event. 
While the first estimation period stops 
short of much of the rise in returns, the sec­
ond period captures most of it. The esti­
mates from [ — 36, —4] are from a period 
of almost exclusively higher returns and 
are much larger. The mean a from 
[ — 36, —4] is double that estimated over 
[ — 60, —25]. The measures in the last two 
rows are based largely on the postevent pe­
riods over which lower average returns are 
observed. The mean a from [ — 36, —4] is 
more than double that of the postevent pe­
riod [4, 36].
These differences in a lead one to expect 
sizable differences in the residuals from the 
market model depending on the choice of 
estimation period, and one observes them 
(Table 11.5). The cumulative residuals are 
uniformly lower when measured against 
the last 33 months of the preevent period 
[—36, —4] than when measured against 
the last 57 months [ — 60, —4]. Acquiring-
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Table 11.5 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Based on Selected 
Estimation Periods: All Sample Firms
Estimation Period
Forecast Period [-60, -4] [-36, -4] [13, 36]
[-3,-1] -.0148(-.5683)“
-.0298
(-.7743) —
[0] .0019 -.0028 ___(-.3386) (-.4784)
[1,6] -.0336 -.0620 -.0175(-1.2730) (-1.7100) (-.8249)
[7, 12] -.0121 -.0508 -.0146(-.6261) (-1.5890) (-.7386)
[1, 12] -.0457 -.1128 -.0321(-1.3429) (-2.3328) (-1.1057)
[13, 24] -.0096 -.0940 ___(-.3403) (-1.5520)
[25, 36] -.0883 -.1826 ___(-2.1150) (-4.5930)
[-3, 36] -.1567(-1.2464)
-.4221
(-4.9307)
—
“The numbers in parentheses are the test statistics which are distributed standard normal.
firm shareholders experienced an insig­
nificant decline in returns of 15.67% over 
the period [ — 3, 36] as measured against 
the acquiring-firms’ performance over 
[—60, —4]. They experienced a significant 
decline in returns almost three times 
greater than that when returns are mea­
sured against performance over [—36, 
-4],
Table 11.5 reveals that the choice of 
preevent period against which postevent 
performance is measured can have a sig- ^ 
nificant effect on one’s conclusions as to 
the change in performance following an 
acquisition. Several studies measure ac­
quiring-firm postevent performance not 
against a preevent period, however, but 
against a subsequent postevent period.’ 
But the average performance of acquiring 
firms in the postevent periods is systemat­
ically lower, as measured by a, as is evi­
dent in Table 11.4. Thus, use of postevent- 
period estimates of the market model yield 
systematically higher residuals than do 
preevent estimates. The third column of 
Table 11.5 reports the cumulative resid­
uals for the first 12 postannouncement 
months measured against the acquiring
companies’ predicted performance from 
[13, 36]. They are an insignificant —3%. In 
contrast, if the acquiring companies’ per­
formance over these 12 months is mea­
sured against how they did over the last 33 
months of the preevent period, one ob­
serves a significant 11% lower return in the 
first year after the announcements. The dif­
ferences in estimates of postevent normal 
returns, depending on choice of base pe­
riod against which performance is judged, 
are depicted in Figure 11.1.
Acquiring firms performed substantially 
better over the period [ — 24, —4] than they 
did over [—60, —25]. If we define the lat­
ter as normal, then acquiring firms exhibit 
above-normal performance starting be­
tween two and three years before the ac­
quisition announcements, an interpreta­
tion which is consistent with that of other 
studies reviewed later. Assuming this 
preevent performance is above normal, 
then acquiring firms must eventually ex­
hibit some worsening of performance 
postevent. At some point in time, the mar­
ket must adjust fully to whatever it is that 
causes the above-normal performance. A 
key methodological issue in judging the ef-
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Figure 11.1. Month relative to event month. For all three cases, errors in [-24, -4] are calculated 
relative to performance in [-60, -25]. For case I, errors in [-3, 36] are based on [-60, -4]; for 
II, they are based on [-36, -4]. Case III is identical to case I for [-24, 0]; errors for [1, 12] are 
calculated relative to performance in [13, 36].
fects of acquisitions is the relationship be­
tween this point in time and the announce­
ment month.
To begin to answer this question, one 
must explain why acquiring firms earn 
above-normal returns long before an ac­
quisition. One possible explanation is that 
managers choose to acquire other compa- 
^ nies when their own firms and their shares 
are doing relatively well. If this assumption 
is valid, the next question is whether the 
acquisitions are announced toward the be­
ginning, middle, or end of these periods of 
above-normal performanee. This is the 
kind of counterfactual question that never 
can be answered in a merger study. Our ac­
quiring firms exhibit an upward trend in 
returns for roughly three years prior to the 
announcements. If the announcements 
come in the middle of the period of above­
normal performance, then comparison of 
the first three postevent years with the last 
three preevent years would be appropriate.
Bradley and Jarrell’s calculation of 
postevent performance in their comment
(Chapter 15) effectively assumes that the 
announeements occur at the end of the pe­
riod of above-normal performance. That 
the acquiring companies’ period of above­
normal performance just happens to end 
around the time the acquisitions are an­
nounced strikes us as an unlikely coinci­
dence. Their estimate of the eumulative re­
turn to acquiring-firm shareholders over 
the three postevent years, which is almost 
identical to our estimate of — 15.65% using 
the [—60, —4] interval as benchmark, we 
thus regard as an upper-bound measure of 
acquiring-firm performance. The —42.2% 
estimate using the interval [ — 36, —4] as 
benchmark, which implicitly assumes that 
the announcements occur in the middle of 
the above-normal performance period, is 
perhaps a reasonable lower bound.*
Our main results are summarized in 
Table 11.6, in which we again break out 
the merger and tender offer subsamples. If 
one assumes that the market’s adjustment 
to news of an acquisition takes place en­
tirely within the announcement month.
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Table 11.6 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for Different Time 
Periods
Estimation Period [—60, —4]
Cumulation Period All Firms Mergers Tender Offers
10] .0019 -.0037 .0138
(-.3386) (-.6769) (.4500)
1-3, 6] -.0465 -.0832 .0282
(-1.4039) (-1.7776) (.2070)
[-3, 12] -.0586 -.1084 .0491
(-1.4932) (-1.7885) (.2229)
[-3, 24] -.0682 -.0803 -.0417
(-1.3513) (-.6900) (-.4920)
[-3, 36] -.1565 -.2774 .0892
(-1.2464) (-2.6039)
Estimation Period [ — 36, —4]
(.5633)
10] -.0028 -.0070 .0065
(-.4784) (-.8527) (.4637)
[-3, 6] -.0946 -.1144 -.0514
(-1.8993) (-1.4770) (-1.004)
[-3, 12] -.1454 -.1692 -.0859
(-2.4746) (-1.8976) (-1.2304)
1-3, 24] -.2394 -.2125 -.2857
(-2.8866) (-1.4076) (-2.7711)
[-3, 36] -.4220 -.4909 -.2734
(-4.9307) (-4.2564) (-2.1715)
The numbers in parentheses are the test statistics which are distributed standard normal.
then acquisitions have no significant im- ^ 
pact on acquiring-firm shareholders. If, 
however, one allows the market three years 
following the announcement to evaluate 
an acquisition’s effects, then acquiring-firm 
shareholders are significantly worse off fol­
lowing an acquisition than they would 
have been had the acquiring firms contin­
ued to perform as they had over the three 
years (i.e., the [—36, —4] interval) prior to 
the acquisition. The hypothesis that ac­
quiring-firm shareholders are better off as a 
result of acquisitions fares better if one 
uses the longer preevent period [—60, —4] 
and, in general, if one uses shorter post­
event periods.
Studies on this subject vary considerably 
in their choices of pre- and postevent-pe- 
riod lengths when estimating the effects of 
acquisitions. We favor a longer postevent 
period, because we doubt that all relevant ^ 
information regarding an acquisition’s 
likely effects reaches the market in the an­
nouncement month, and that the move­
ments of stock prices in the few months 
surrounding an acquisition are, necessar­
ily, unbiased estimates of the future con­
sequences of the acquisitions.
Both the merger and tender offer sub­
samples reveal substantial declines in the 
stockholder returns over the three years 
following the announcement month, as 
judged against the [—36, —4] time-period 
performance. For the merging firms, the 
biggest decline occurs in the third year fol­
lowing the announcement; for the tender 
offer bidders, in the second. We do not 
place much weight on this difference. In­
deed, we anticipate significant changes in 
stock market values for individual com­
panies at different points of time following 
the initial announcement as additional in­
formation reaches the market. This antici­
pation is what leads us to favor a relatively 
long postevent interval for measuring the 
effects of acquisitions.
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Jensen and Ruback (1983) stress the im­
portance of differentiating between merg­
ers and tender offers in event studies, and 
some support for the position is present in 
our results. Acquiring-firm shareholders 
are noticeably better off in tender offers 
than they are in mergers. But the similari­
ties between the two subsamples are also 
noteworthy. Both groups experience an up­
ward trend in abnormal returns over 
roughly three years prior to the acqui­
sition’s announcement. Commencing 
roughly with the announcement, the paths 
of abnormal returns for the two groups are 
refracted. After another three years, both 
groups of shareholders are significantly 
worse off than they would have been had 
their companies continued to perform in 
the postevent period [ — 3, 36] as they had 
prior to the event [ — 36, —4].
If our study were the only one to expose 
such a pattern of returns, one might be in­
clined to dismiss the substantial differ­
ences between the post and preannounce­
ment acquiring-firm share performances as 
curiosa of our sample. But as we shall now 
illustrate, the same pattern has been ob­
served in several studies from different 
time periods and countries.
A REEXAMINATION OF THE EITERATURE
The results of the previous section indicate 
that, at least for our sample, acquiring 
firms do earn substantial, positive abnor­
mal returns prior to the market’s learning 
of acquisitions and that acquiring-firm 
shareholders are not better off, relative to 
this preevent performance, after informa­
tion of the acquisition reaches the market. 
Moreover, whether the acquiring-firm 
shareholders are judged no better off or sig­
nificantly worse off depends on both the 
pre- and postevent periods used in the 
comparison.
In this section, we further illustrate the 
importance of these methodological issues 
by examining results reported in several 
other studies. While all take inspiration 
from the CAPM, they actually differ in a 
surprisingly large number of respects, and
it is not possible to comment on each in 
detail. We focus upon the general patterns.
Our thesis emphasizes the possible im­
portance of the return pattern both before 
and after an acquisition, and thus we ex­
clude from consideration studies that leave 
out entirely or severely truncate these pre- 
and postevent periods (e.g., Halpern, 1973; 
Bradley, 1980; Dodd, 1980; Asquith et al., 
1983). To facilitate comparisons, we focus 
upon only those studies that measure re­
turns by months or days surrounding a sin­
gle-event announcement, i.e., we do not 
consider studies which measure returns on 
an annual basis (Hogarty, 1970; Lev and 
Mandelker, 1972; and those in Mueller, 
1980).
The first group of studies we wish to con­
sider measures a firm’s return performance 
in any day or month relative to that of a 
control group. Bradley (1980), Asquith 
(1983), and Asquith et al. (1983) use Cen­
ter for Research in Security Prices excess 
returns and thus use as a control group 
companies with ^’s similar to those of the 
acquiring firms. The prediction in these 
studies is that an acquiring firm would 
earn a return each day equal to that of 
firms with similar d’s. Of the three, only 
Asquith (1983) presents sufficient returns 
data before and after the announcement 
date to allow comparison with the other 
studies in this section.
Table 11.7 summarizes his main results. 
Asquith reports 22 months of returns data 
prior to the announcement day. The ac­
quiring firms earn positive cumulative ex­
cess returns over this entire preannounce­
ment period. Acquiring-firm shareholders 
enjoy cumulative abnormal returns above 
those earned by shareholders in the control 
group of 14% between the first month in 
Asquith’s data series (—22) and the last 
month before the market learns of the 
merger (—2). The cumulative excess re­
turns for acquiring-firm shareholders reach 
a peak of 14.5% above the control group on 
press day and level off through the period 
between announcement and consumma­
tion; 30 trading days after the merger a 
decline begins that continues for as long as 
Asquith reports figures (roughly 17 months
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after announcement). An individual who 
purchased an acquiring firm’s shares just 
prior to the first signs of market knowledge 
of the merger (— 1) and held them through­
out the period over which Asquith reports 
data would have experienced a cumulative 
return 7.2% below that of shareholders of 
nonacquiring firms with similar /3’s over 
the same period.
An analogous procedure to that just de­
scribed uses Fama-MacBeth residuals. 
These are calculated from the following 
equation:
eu = Ri, — 7u — 7ith (11-4)
where and /?, are defined as before. The 
7„ and 72, parameters are the cross-section 
estimates of the intercept and slope from 
monthly regressions of average portfolio 
returns on average d. Thus, 7,, and 72, dif­
fer from month to month, but for any sin­
gle month they are the same for all firms. 
The acquiring firm’s predicted return for 
each period t reflects market factors com­
mon to all firms. Thus the use of Fama- 
MacBeth residuals effectively treats the 
market portfolio as the control group. 
Table 11.7 summarizes the main results for 
three studies which employ Fama-Mac­
Beth residuals (Mandelker, 1974; Ellert, 
1976; Kummer and Hoffmeister, 1978). All 
three studies again exhibit positive pre­
merger returns for acquiring-firm share­
holders commencing in Ellert’s study with 
the first month of data, some 100 months 
prior to the merger. Mandelker’s study ex­
hibits a leveling off and slight decline in re­
turns commencing around the time of 
merger announcement, as Asquith’s study 
did. Ellert’s sample is more difficult to in­
terpret, since it consists of firms whose 
mergers were challenged by the FTC or 
Justice Department. The firms, which 
eventually succeeded in consummating the 
mergers, experienced a very slight decline 
in returns relative to the market portfolio 
over the 48 months after the challenge to 
the merger was settled.
The Kummer and Hoffmeister (1978) re­
sults indicate substantial positive abnor­
mal returns for acquiring-firm sharehold­
ers in the month the tender offer is
announced, followed by no clear pattern. It 
is the only study in Table 11.7 for which 
the acquiring-firm shareholders do better 
than their control group over the 
combined announcement-event-postevent 
period.
The four studies examined so far are 
similar in that they all measure a firm’s ex­
cess return in any month relative to a con­
trol group’s performance. Any inference re­
garding the change in acquiring-firm 
performance must be drawn by comparing 
the preevent performance of the acquiring 
firms relative to their control groups and 
their postevent performance relative to 
these control groups.
All four studies report positive, abnor­
mal return performance for acquiring-firm 
shareholders over periods ranging from 17 
to 100 months prior to announcement. All 
report a poorer relative performance for 
the acquiring companies’ shares over 
the announcement-event-postevent pe­
riod than observed for the preevent period. 
Indeed, only one study reports significant 
positive gains relative to the control group 
for this period (Kummer and Hoffmeister), 
but the abnormal gains they report for the 
21 months commencing with an acquisi­
tion’s announcement are only a third of 
the abnormal returns the same firms 
earned over the preceding 28 months. In 
the Mandelker and Ellert studies, the ac­
quiring firms perform roughly the same as 
the control group firms following the 
merger announcements. In Asquith’s 
study, the acquiring firms perform signifi­
cantly worse than their control group after 
the mergers, where they had performed sig­
nificantly better before.
Before turning to the next set of studies, 
let us briefly reconsider Mandelker’s re­
sults. Although the general pattern of re­
turn performance in Mandelker’s study re­
sembles the others, the premerger rise in 
returns is much smaller. Mandelker’s sam­
pling of mergers stops in 1963. Unlike the 
other three studies, it does not include 
mergers from the peak years of merger and 
stock market activity, 1967-1969. Consis­
tent with our earlier arguments that merg­
ing firms’ returns may be particularly af-
Table 11.7. Before- and After-Acquisition Performance of Acquiring Companies in Nine Studies
Study
Time
Period
(Country)
Control Group
Against Which
Preacquisition
Abnormal
Performance
Measured
Month
Information
of
Acquisition 
Reaches 
Market (f,)
Month in
Which
Cumulative
Residuals
Begin
Upward
Trend (/„)
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Returns at 
Month //_ 1
Control Group
Against Which
Postmerger
Abnormal
Performance
Measured
Month 
Following 
Acquisition in 
Which Fall in 
Cumulative 
Residuals
Stops ((/)
Difference
Between
Cumulative
Residuals
in /yand
^-1
Last Month 
for Which 
Return 
Performance 
Reported (f^)
Difference 
Between 
Cumulative 
Residuals 
in tg and
Notes
Asquith (1983) 1962-1976
(USA)
Companies 
with similar 
0s
-1 -22® 14.0 Companies 
with similar 
0s
17 -7.2 17 -7.2 Returns reported in days. 
We have converted to 
months by dividing by
22 trading days per 
month. Interval 
between
announcement day 
and merger 
completion assumed 
to equal 6 months.
Mandelker
(1974)
1941-1963
(USA)
Fama-MacBeth
residuals
-1 -17 3.5 Fama-MacBeth
residuals
46 +0.2 46 +0.2 Mandeiker’s data 
centered around 
merger completion. 
We have assumed 
announcement is 6 
months before 
completion.
Ellert(l976) 1950-1972
(USA)
Fama-MacBeth
residuals
-3 -100® 23.6 Fama-MacBeth
residuals
82 -3.4 82 -3.4 Ellert’s data centered 
around month a
merger complaint is 
made by antitrust 
authorities. We 
assume announcement 
month is same as 
complaint month. 
Premerger returns are 
for all acquirors: 
postmerger for only 
those which completed 
the acquisition.
Kummer and 1956-1974 Fama-MacBeth 0 -28 17.0 Fama-MacBeth No systematic 20 + 5.8
Hoffmeister (USA) residuals residuals movement
(1978) following
merger
Study
Time
Period
(Country)
Control Group
Against Which
Premerger
Abnormal
Performance
Measured
Month 
Information 
of Merger 
Reaches 
Market (//)
Month in
Which
Cumulative
Residuals
Begin Upward 
Trend (/«)
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Returns at 
Month ti-\
Dodd and 
Ruback 
(1977)
1958-1976
(USA)
Acquiring firm’s 
performance 
relative to 
market 
portfolio 
— 73 through 
-14
-1 -43 10.47
Franks et al.
(1977)
1955-1972
(UK)
Acquiring firm’s 
performance 
relative to its 
industry,
— 29 through 
+ 8
-3 No systematic 
movement 
prior to 
merger
-0.3
Langetieg
(1978)
1929-1969
(USA)
Acquiring firm’s 
performance 
relative to 
market 
portfolio and 
its two-digit 
SIC industry, 
-72 to -12
0 -60 13.58
Firth (1980) 1969-1975
(UK)
Acquiring firm’s 
performance 
relative to 
market 
portfolio in
48 preceding 
months
-1 -48“ 1.5
Malatesta
(1983)
1969-1974
(USA)
Acquiring firm’s 
performance 
relative to 
market 
portfolio in 
36-month 
period from 
—62 to — 1
-4(?) -60“ (?) 3.6
Notes: Month 0 is the announcement month. 
^First month for which data are reported.
Control Group
Against Which
Postmerger
Abnormal
Performance
Measured
Month 
Following 
Merger in 
Which Fall 
in
Cumulative 
Residuals 
Stops (0
Difference
Between
Cumulative
Residuals
in /yand
ti-\
Last Month 
for Which 
Return 
Performance 
Reported {t^
Difference 
Between 
Cumulative 
Residuals in 
te and //_i Notes
Acquiring firm’s 60 - 1.85 60 -1.85
performance 
relative to 
market 
portfolio 
+14 through 
+ 73
Acquiring firm’s 15 - 2.4 40 -0.1 Sample is for acquisitions
performance in brewing and
relative to its distillery. Returns are
industry, measured net of
-29 to +8 industry index.
Acquiring firm’s 78 -29.0 78 -29.0 Langetieg’s data centered
performance around merger
relative to completion month. We
market have assumed
portfolio and announcement is 6
its two-digit months before
SIC industry, completion based on
+ 12 to +72 acquired-firm return 
performance.
Acquiring firm’s 1 - 7.4 36 -4.8
performance 
relative to 
market 
portfolio in
48 preceding 
months 
(omitting —
12 to +12)
Acquiring firm’s 12 - 7.7 12 -7.7
performance 
relative to 
market 
portfolio in 
36-month 
period in 
+13 to +60
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fected by stock market swings, both the 
more modest premerger increases and 
postmerger declines recorded by Man- 
delker may stem from his having em­
ployed a merger sample drawn from a 
more tranquil period of stock market- 
merger activity.
The last technique for estimating the ef­
fect of acquisitions we consider uses the re­
siduals from some variant on Equation 
(11.5):
= (Rii — Rfd — a.
-k(Rnu-Rft) (11.5)
Recall that the value of a for the average 
firm is zero and that a, thus captures a 
firm’s abnormal performance over the 
time period from which (11.5) is esti­
mated. Thus, if (11.5) is estimated over a 
period prior to the event’s announcement, 
the residuals from (11.5) at and after an­
nouncement do measure the change in per­
formance for the firm relative to the pre­
event period over which (11.5) was esti­
mated. More generally, the inferences one 
draws from residuals from (11.5) are sen­
sitive to the time period over which it is 
estimated.
This point is illustrated by the bottom 
five entries of Table 11.7. We first consider 
the study of Dodd and Rubaek (1977) in 
some detail, since it clearly illustrates the 
issues. They estimate Equation (11.5) 
separately on data from [—73, —14] 
and [14, 73]. If the pre- and post-tender 
offer performance of acquiring firms in 
their sample resembles that of the studies 
just discussed, then acquiring firms exhibit 
above-normal performance over some 
part, if not all, of [ — 73, —14] and normal 
or below-normal performance over part or 
all of [14, 73]. The a’s from (11.5) over 
[ — 73, —14] will be higher than those for 
[14, 73].’ The residuals they report for 
[ — 60, — 1] are for a and /8 estimated over 
[ — 73, —14] and those for [0, 60] from 
[14, 73]. Thus, the reported residuals for 
the preevent period are calculated against 
a benchmark of above-normal perfor­
mance and are thus smaller than if they 
had been measured relative to a period of 
poorer performance. Residuals for the an­
nouncement month and postevent period 
are ealeulated against a benehmark of 
poorer performanee than the preevent pe­
riod and thus are certainly larger than they 
would be if they were measured against the 
acquiring firms’ preevent performance.
That these inferences are likely to be 
valid can be seen by an examination of the 
cumulative residuals for the bidding firms 
in the Dodd and Rubaek study (Figure 
11.2).‘° As with the studies using CRSP 
and Fama-MaeBeth residuals, a period of 
sustained above-normal performance is 
observed commencing at A some 43 
months prior to the initial tender offer 
month (R), where normal is now defined as 
how these firms did over the period [ — 73, 
— 14]. Since acquiring-firm performance 
over [ — 73, —14] is, if anything, above that 
predicted from the market portfolio and 
Equation (11.1), these residuals probably 
understate the extent of abnormal, positive 
performanee of acquiring firms prior to the 
acquisitions. A period of gradual but sus­
tained decline in share returns eommences 
at C, month 6, about the time the take­
overs are probably consummated." It eon- 
tinues through month 60 and coneeivably 
through 73. It is against this period of de­
teriorating performance [14, 73] that the 
abnormal returns [0, 60] are calculated. 
Thus, the level of returns in the interval [0, 
12] is judged relative to how the firms did 
from one to six years after the tender offers, 
not to how they did before. A comparison 
of Figures 11.2 and 11.1 reveals that Dodd 
and Ruback’s acquiring-firm residuals pat­
tern resembles the pattern for our sample 
when a postevent estimation period is used 
as benchmark (our case III). Had preevent 
period a’s and |8’s been used by Dodd and 
Rubaek, their postevent residuals probably 
would have exhibited a steeper decline, as 
with our cases I and II."
Similar reasoning calls into question 
Dodd and Ruback’s conclusion that ac­
quiring-company shareholders are better 
off from the acquisitions on the basis of the 
statistically significant average residual of 
2.83% in the announcement month. The 
rise in “abnormal” returns in month 
0 stems in part from the switch at this 
month from the higher performance period
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[ — 73, —14] a’s and d’s to the lower-period 
[14, 73] estimates. That is, acquiring-firm 
shares appear to have gained in abnormal 
performance in month 0 partly because 
the benchmark of normality has shifted 
downward.
The importance of the treatment of a 
and thus the choice of time period over 
which a is estimated is further illustrated 
by Malatesta’s (1983) study. Residuals 
over the period [ — 60, — 13] are calculated 
by using the first available 36 observations 
from the preceding 50 months. The cu­
mulative average a over [—24, —4] is 10.7, 
and the forecast error is —1.6. Thus, ac­
quiring firms in Malatesta’s sample also 
were earning significantly higher returns 
than the market portfolio prior to the mar­
ket’s learning of the mergers. The modest 
cumulative residuals Malatesta reports for 
the premerger period relative to the acquir­
ing firms’ performance over this period 
merely indicate that the above-normal per­
formance for the acquiring firms was fairly 
uniform throughout the entire premerger 
period [ — 62, —1] and thus is adequately 
represented by his a estimates.
The residuals for months 1 through 60 
are calculated from a and d estimated from 
the first available 36 months in the interval
[13, 60]. The cumulative residuals over 
[1, 12] are negative and significant even re­
lative to the acquiring firms’ subsequent 
performance in the postmerger period. 
While Malatesta does not report the a’s for 
the postmerger residuals, one presumes 
from Asquith’s results that they would be 
substantially less than the 10.7% cumula­
tive a obtained prior to the mergers. Thus, 
the acquiring firms probably did even 
worse during the first 12 months after the 
announcements, compared with how they 
were doing before, than is implied by the 
residuals Malatesta calculates relative to 
the postmerger period’s a’s and d’s.
The importance of how one treats the a 
estimates from Equation (11.5) is further 
illustrated by the results of Langetieg’s 
(1978) study. Langetieg estimates a variant 
on Equation (11.5), which also controls for 
movements in acquiring-firm returns com­
mon to all firms in the acquiring firm’s 
two-digit SIC industry. His measure of ab­
normal returns for firm i is the sum of a, 
and eu- Thus, although Langetieg estimates 
separate a’s and |S’s for the pre- and post­
merger periods, his measures of abnormal 
returns do not suffer from the same prob­
lems as the Dodd and Ruback and Mala­
testa measures do, because Langetieg in-
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eludes the respective a’s as part of the 
abnormal returns, thus building into his re­
sults the systematic change in the 
intercept.
The cumulative excess returns for the 
acquiring firms turn positive 60 months 
prior to the point in time when informa­
tion of the merger reaches the market. 
Over these 60 months, shareholders of ac­
quiring firms enjoy excess returns of 
13.58% over what one predicts from move­
ments in both the market portfolio and the 
acquiring firm’s two-digit industry.'^
In what is now a familiar pattern, we 
witness in Langetieg’s data a leveling off of 
excess returns between the market’s first 
knowledge of the mergers and their con­
summation, and then a sustained decline. 
The acquiring-firm returns decline contin­
uously over the 72 months following a 
merger. A shareholder who bought into an 
acquiring firm just prior to the market’s 
learning of the merger and held its shares 
for the next 78 months would experience a 
cumulative loss relative to the market 
portfolio and shareholders of other firms in 
the same industry of 29%.
Firth (1980) calculates the residual at 
month t from a and d estimates for the 48 
months immediately preceding t, when t 
varies from —48 to —13. Thus, if acquir­
ing firms earned above-normal returns 
uniformly over a substantial interval prior 
to the mergers, this fact would not be ap­
parent in the residuals for the premerger 
period.
The residuals over the entire interval 
[ — 12, 12] are calculated by using d’s 
and d’s estimated from [—60, —13]. Thus, 
unlike the results in both Dodd and Ru- 
back and Malatesta, the immediate pre- 
and postannouncement residuals are all 
calculated relative to the acquiring com­
panies’ premerger return performance. As 
it turns out, in Firth’s study this difference 
does not prove to be important. The mar­
ket adjusts fully in the announcement 
month, at which time the acquiring-firm 
shareholders suffer a significant 6.3% loss 
relative to premerger performance. The re­
siduals for the postmerger months reveal 
no distinctive pattern.
The Franks et al. (1977) study of 94 ac­
quisitions by United Kingdom breweries 
and distilleries is difficult to analyze. They 
first present, for the combined merging 
companies, cumulative average residuals 
which “display a strong upward bias 
throughout, thus exhibiting effects which 
cannot be attributed to mergers’’ (1977, p. 
1521). Since the residuals for the acquiring 
and acquired firms are combined, one can­
not determine whether it is the perfor­
mance of the former or the latter which 
accounts for this positive abnormal pre­
merger performance. But if it were the ac­
quiring firms that were exhibiting above­
normal premerger performance, the 
Franks et al. results would correspond 
closely to those of the other studies we 
have discussed. When they control for in­
dustry performance, the acquiring firms 
exhibit no above-normal returns prior to 
the merger. But since the acquiring firms 
are part of the industry index, this choice 
of control group introduces a bias toward 
zero in the residual estimates.
Franks et al. estimate Equation (11.5) 
over the time period [—29, 8], omitting an 
interval around the announcement, which 
“is adjusted on the basis of the resulting es­
timates of abnormal residuals” (p. 1515). 
Given that the excluded interval varies 
from firm to firm, it is difficult to deter­
mine against what yardstick abnormal per­
formance is being gauged. Nevertheless, re­
turns initially rise (from —4 through 0) 
and then decline, leaving acquiring share­
holders no better off as a result of the merg­
ers. “Indeed since some gain would have 
been anticipated as a result of premerger 
interests [of the acquiring firms in the 
targets], one could argue that there may 
have been losses exclusive of these inter­
ests” (p. 1523).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
To acquire another firm, a buyer must pay 
a substantial premium over the current 
market value of the target. In our sample, 
this premium averaged 81% of the target 
firms’ market value. Thus, over the period 
between the initial decision to acquire and
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the completion of an acquisition, share­
holders of acquired firms enjoy substantial 
increases in their wealth. The key question 
for the theory of the firm and for antimer­
ger policy is whether these wealth increases 
measure net increases in wealth for society 
as a result of some synergistic efficiency 
gain, or mere wealth transfers from acquir­
ing-firm to acquired-firm shareholders.
To answer this question, one must mea­
sure the effects of the acquisitions on ac­
quiring-firm shareholder wealth. While it 
is reasonable to assume that the changes in 
acquiring-firm shareholder wealth related 
to the acquisition begin about the same 
time as the changes in acquired-firm share­
holder wealth begin, somewhere between 
the announcement and four months be­
fore, it is arguable whether all changes in 
acquiring-firm wealth caused by the acqui­
sition are complete by the date of its an­
nouncement or its completion. Conceiva­
bly, new information about its future 
consequences might reach the market at 
intermittent intervals for some time after 
the market’s first knowledge of the acqui­
sition. This consideration suggests that a 
longer-run perspective of the consequences 
of acquisitions for acquiring-firm share­
holders might be appropriate than is war­
ranted for acquired-firm shareholders.
Several studies have measured the per­
formance of acquiring firms relative to the 
average firm in the stock market or in the 
acquiring firm’s industry, both before and 
after acquisition announcements.A con­
sistent pattern emerges. Acquiring firms 
begin to experience significant positive ab­
normal returns as early as 100 months 
prior to the acquisition announcements. 
The cumulative preacquisition gains of ac­
quiring-firm shareholders are inevitably 
positive and are typically large.
Starting around the time the market be­
gins to learn of an acquisition, or at its con­
summation, the performance of the acquir­
ing firm’s shares begins to deteriorate 
relative to their preevent performance. In 
some cases, they exhibit a roughly normal 
postevent performance (e.g., Mandelker, 
1974); in others, a significant relative dec­
line (Langetieg, 1978; Asquith, 1983).'^
A second set of studies measures an ac­
quiring firm’s performance as a result of an 
acquisition, relative to this performance 
over another period, controlling for gen­
eral shifts in the economy by using the 
basic CAPM equation (11.5). Given that 
the acquiring firm’s performance relative 
to the market (or its industry) differs sig­
nificantly over the pre- and postevent time 
intervals, estimates of “abnormal” returns 
to acquiring-firm shareholders are sensi­
tive to the choice of time period over 
which the “normal” a and of Equation 
(11.5) are measured. Our own results in­
dicate significant above-normal returns are 
earned by acquiring-firm shareholders 
over the immediate two to three years 
prior to the market’s learning of an acqui­
sition, relative to the performance of these 
firms in the three preceding years. Follow­
ing the market’s receipt of information of 
the acquisition, the acquiring firms’ share­
holders experience lower returns than they 
enjoyed over the preevent period. More­
over, the deterioration in performance is 
more dramatic if comparison is made with 
the immediate three years’ performance 
than if comparison is with the five preev­
ent years.
Our findings are consistent with those of 
other studies using Equation (11.5) and the 
CAPM, although comparisons are made 
difficult by the differing choices of time pe­
riods for estimating (11.5). A significant 
decline in acquiring-firm returns is ob­
served by Firth (1980) in the announce­
ment month and perhaps by Franks et al. 
(1977) in the first few months following the 
merger announcements. Malatesta (1983) 
observes a significant decline in acquiring- 
firm performance in the first 12 months 
after the announcement, relative to the ac­
quiring companies’ performance over a 
postmerger period; Dodd and Ruback 
(1977) record a steady decline in perfor­
mance over 54 months following the ac­
quisition’s completion, again measured re­
lative to the acquiring companies’ own 
normal postevent performanee. Since ac­
quiring firms perform worse after acquisi­
tions than before, when measured against 
the market, the decline in returns mea­
sured by Malatesta and Dodd and Ruback 
following the acquisitions is in all likeli-
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hood considerably smaller than it would 
have been had these authors measured the 
decline against the predicted performance 
of acquiring firms on the basis of their 
preevent histories.
Thus, the answer to the question posed 
in the title of this chapter, “Are acquiring- 
firm shareholders better off after an acqui­
sition than they were before?” seems to be 
no, if by before we mean the three years or 
so prior to the time information reaches 
the market, and if by after we mean 
the three years or so after this point in 
time.
The evaluation of the effects of acquisi­
tions on acquiring-firm shareholders’ 
wealth presented here is considerably more 
negative than that found in some other 
parts of the literature. Others have reached 
more positive conclusions than we in part 
because they have posed different ques­
tions from ours. To the extent that one 
focuses on the acquiring companies’ per­
formance only at the time of the announce­
ment (e.g., Dodd and Ruback, 1977; Brad­
ley, 1980) and makes one’s comparison not 
to the acquiring firms’ own preevent per­
formance but to that of the market portfo­
lio (e.g., Mandelker, 1974; Kummer and 
Hoffmeister, 1978; Bradley, 1980), one ob­
tains a more optimistic assessment of the 
performance of acquiring-company shares. 
Halpern (1983) ignores the evidence on 
postevent acquiring-company returns en­
tirely in his survey; Jensen and Ruback 
(1983) clearly give more weight to the fig­
ures regarding the gains at the time of ac­
quisition in their Table 3 than they do to 
the figures which include postacquisition 
performance in Table 4. Neither survey 
has much to say about the substantial pos­
itive abnormal returns acquiring-firm 
shareholders earn before the market learns 
of the acquisitions.
The stock market is subject to substan­
tial swings in returns that cannot be justi­
fied by an application of the rational-ex­
pectations assumption to subsequent 
dividend streams. Acquisition activity is 
correlated with stock market activity and 
is arguably subject to the same underlying 
psychological factors and motivations. The
stock market may be over- or under opti­
mistic about the future consequences of ac­
quisitions at different points in time. 
Moreover, an acquisition is a sufficiently 
complex event that it might take the mar­
ket more than a single month or year to 
form an aecurate estimate of its future ef­
fect. These considerations suggest to us the 
need for a longer-run view of the conse­
quences of acquisitions. But whether or 
not one agrees with us on this point, we do 
hope we have achieved our goal of dem­
onstrating that one’s answer to the ques­
tion “Are shareholders of acquiring firms 
better off after an acquisition than they 
were before?” is sensitive to both the 
choice of time intervals over which before 
and after performance is defined and the 
choice of benchmark against which perfor­
mance is measured.
NOTES
1. Nelson (1959, 1966); Melicher et al. 
(1983); Geroski (1984). Casual observation sug­
gests that this correlation may have weakened 
in the most recent years. But the cited studies 
carry the analysis up through the midseventies. 
Since all of the empirical work discussed in this 
chapter, save our own, is from the period in 
which the positive correlation has been found to 
exist, our point with respect to the existing lit­
erature and its interpretation is valid even if it 
should prove that acquisition activity is no 
longer strongly correlated with stock market 
price movements.
2. Recent critiques by Roll (1977) and Levy 
(1983), among others, call into question some of 
the assumptions of the CAPM. While these pa­
pers pose serious challenges to many of the con­
clusions drawn from the CAPM, they carry less 
weight with regard to the literature on the effects 
of acquisitions. The market portfolio may be a 
reasonable choice as a control group for pre­
dicting changes in an acquiring firm’s returns, 
even if it is not a reasonable portfolio for an in­
dividual to hold.
3. The total number of firms exceeds the 
number of firms involved in mergers and tender 
offers because one of the firms could not be 
classified.
4. The pattern of overall acquisition activ­
ity during the sample period can be seen in this 
record of completed acquisitions:
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Year Number of Acquisitions Percent Change
1976 1145 16.7
1977 1209 5.6
1978 1452 20.1
1979 1564 7.7
1980 1583 1.2
1981 2314 46.2
Transactions counted here are valued at $1 mil­
lion or more; the list includes partial acquisi­
tions {Mergers and Acquisitions, Winter 1984).
5. See Fama (1976) for a full description of 
the market model.
6. Each firm error is divided by its stan­
dard deviation ff(e„), where
= Sj
{R„, - R„f 
X {R„,r-Rn.f^
r - 1
1/2
and
Sj = error variance calculated from the 
_ market model regression for firm i 
R„ = average return on the market portfolio 
over the estimation period 
T = number of months in the estimation 
period
The standardized errors c„/o-(c„) are summed 
and divided by I, the total number of firms, to 
obtain AS„ the average standardized error for 
each time period. We define z, the test statistic, 
as z, = yl, (AS,), where z is distributed as ap­
proximately a normal variable for large sam­
ples. To obtain the test statistic for the null hy­
pothesis that the CAR,,y are insignificantly 
different from zero, we calculate
(y- x + 1)'/^
where z is also distributed approximately nor­
mally for large samples.
7. The typical justification for choosing a 
postevent period against which to measure 
postevent residuals is that the ;8’s may change as 
a result of the acquisition^ But those studies 
which test for shifts in the |8, report no system­
atic shifts in them (see the third section). Nor do 
we find any. For example, only two of the 0’s 
estimated over [ — 3, 36] are significantly differ­
ent from those estimated over [ — 60, —4], one 
being larger, the other smaller. The other 76 in­
significant changes divide almost evenly be­
tween increases and decreases.
8. Michael Jensen also argues that the 
postevent benchmark should be the normal per­
formance of the acquiring firms, not their 
above-normal preevent performance. We thank 
Michael for his comment at the conference, 
which helped clarify our thinking on this point.
9. Although Dodd and Ruback (1977) re­
port the differences between the 0s for the two 
periods, they unfortunately do not report the dif­
ferences in a’s (p. 358).
10. Dodd and Ruback (1977) do not report 
the cumulative residual series, so we have 
added the averages they do report to obtain Fig­
ure 11.2. Our Figure 11.2 corresponds to and re­
sembles very closely their Figure 2.
11. Both Mandelker (1974) and Langetieg 
(1978) center their data around the consumma­
tion of the acquisition, not its announcement. 
Judging from the acquired firms’ returns in 
these studies, information regarding the mergers 
would appear to reach the market about six 
months before the mergers are completed. In 
our sample, four months elapse on average be­
tween first announcement and consummation, 
which corresponds to these other studies if one 
allows two months for preannouncement infor­
mation leakage. We assume the gap between 
announcement and consummation to be six 
months in the Mandelker, Langetieg, and As­
quith studies.
12. The reason Dodd and_ Ruback (1977) 
give for using separate a and ^ estimates from 
before and after the announcement is that for 34 
of the 184 firms in their sample (18%), there is 
a significant change in (pp. 358-359). But 
changes in |8 are equally divided between in­
creases (10 for successful bidders) and declines 
(9). Thus, no systematic shift in residuals should 
result if preannouncement 0s are used. But if 
postannouncement as are significantly lower 
than preannouncement as, postannouncement 
residuals are systematically raised by their 
choice of period against which to measure 
postannouncement performance.
13. Langetieg (1978) reports four sets of sim­
ilar results (Table 1, p. 373). We quote from 
only the first set, using an equally weighted in­
dustry index.
Langetieg also reports residuals net of the 
market portfolio, industry index, and the per­
formance of a “well-matched non-merging 
firm” (p. 371). The latter is selected from the ac­
quiring firm’s two-digit industry by the criterion 
that its residuals from the market portfolio 
regression (11.5) have the highest correlation 
with the residuals for the acquiring firm. This 
criterion for selecting a control group firm
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biases Langetieg’s findings for this comparison 
toward zero. With an infinitely large population 
from which to select control group firms, one 
would find for any acquiring firm a nonacquir­
ing firm whose residuals correlate perfectly, 
leaving nothing to be explained. A two-digit in­
dustry is not an infinite population, but it is 
large enough to introduce serious bias toward 
zero. Nevertheless, the same preevent-positive- 
excess-returns, postevent-negative-excess-re- 
tums pattern appears even after netting out the 
movements in the control group returns (see 
Table 2, p. 377).
14. Since Langetieg (1978) adds a, back into 
his estimate of abnormal returns, his is really an 
estimate relative to both the market portfolio 
and the two-digit SIC industry and should be in­
cluded with this group.
15. Other studies reporting substantial posi­
tive premerger returns for acquiring firms are 
Lev and Mandelker (1972) and Cosh et al. 
(1980).
16. Other studies reporting postmerger pe­
riod declines include Hogarty (1970); Cosh et al. 
(1980); Dodd (1980); Jenny and Weber (1980); 
and Mueller (1980).
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